gaged in their own separate resistances to the King were reluctant to proceed together. They were, in many cases, slow to join the new Union, which began its life on March 3, 1789, with only 11 member states. For many years more, the states' prestige far exceeded that of the national government. Many Americans had never seen a federal employee besides the postman. High office-holders in the Nation sometimes resigned to take similar positions in a state. The location of the national capital in the artificially created Washington, D. C., which had little to attract citizens to visit it, added to the disparity in the pride and affection they showed for their respective governments.2 Federalism, translated into the life of the practicing politician, is localism. Throughout much of the history of Congress, the member spent only part of his time in the capital-about half a year for the "long" session, and four months for the "short," or lame-duck" session. The remainder of his time he lived in his state (and district, for representatives) where he made a living, like other men. He was, therefore, a "representative" in the psychological, as well as the political, meaning of the term. He was "like his folks." He understood them, shared their hopes and expectations, their biases and strengths. Congress mirrored in its personnel the diversities of the Nation. Now, even with the "professionalization" of a Congress which has come to require almost full-time service of its members, localism persists, enhanced by the decline of the parties. Local organizations seldom impose barriers between members and their constituents.
So the congressman has come to be almost entirely a self-selected leader with his life-line to the constituency. It is he (or she) who decides that he is a statesman, needed by the public, and sets out to convince the public. While the constituency supports the member, blessed security is assured. But when the constituents suspect that his heart may be elsewhere, his political life is in hazard; who lives by the sword, dies by the sword. The examples are many: Scott Lucas and Ernest McFarland, Senate Democratic Majority Leaders; Fred Harris, Wayne Morse, J. William Fulbright. Careers, both successful and still promising, come to an end far from the Nation's capital. And there is no way they can be recoupedno 'safe districts," as in England, to which they can repair.
So members of Congress concentrate on constituencies-successfully it seems, as average tenure lengthens steadily and turnover decreases. This is crucial to the nature and operations of Congress: a member secure in his home base need fear no other political threat. And that security is a basic element of the independence of Congress.
The historic liberal concept of separation of powers is the second fundamental which has had much to do with shaping the American system.
Its pedigree is impressive. John Locke believed that separation had preserved England from the tyranny which generally oppressed the nations of the continent. Montesquieu, the French philosopher who wrote the celebrated The Spirit of the Laws, accepted Locke's thesis (although his famous statement on separation is a small part of a very large book). Blackstone, the English lawyer who was read by so many Americans, took it as received doctrine.
But the Americans were not doctrinaire, even in the application of their doctrines. They were used to a governor appointed by the king, an upper house similarly chosen, and a lower house elected by the people. A cabinet government was an idea far in the future, but the colonial government had some of its seeds. Their governor was an executive who also had a strong legislative hand. The upper house counseled the governor, sat as a judicial court, and was part of the legislature. The lower house, usually estranged from the king's men, were legislators only. But the powers were not confused; they were exercised separately. The Founding Fathers separated the institutions, but in providing "checks and balances" they commingled the exercise of the distinct kinds of powers among the institutions. They apparently accepted Madison's dictum that all Montesquieu meant was "that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."3 So the legislative power rests not just with Congress, but with a president who espouses a wide array of programs and is judged by his legislative "box score," and also with a judiciary whose decisions may be more important legislation than Congress's (e.g., the School 3Fisher, President, 23.
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Desegregation Cases in 1954 and Baker v. Carr, "one-man, onevote" ruling in 1962). The executive power is shared by a Congress which must acquiesce if a president is even to reorganize the executive department. The courts take on administrative tasks of breath-taking scope but are confined in jurisdiction by congressional and presidential legislation.
But the people, the institutions, are separated. No officer may serve in more than one branch simultaneously. This has had profound effect on Congress since the beginning. A parliamentary body may take its information and directions from the executive because the ministry is also the leadership of the principal legislative body. No so with a Congress to whom the executive branch must be "they." So each house established committees early on to test information and recommendation. Special committees gave way to standing, and standing committees gained specialized jurisdiction. In time the committees gained virtual control over subjects in their jurisdiction. In 1884, Woodrow Wilson said, "Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work."4
The two concepts together insure the freedom of Congress from control by the executive. The local base of the individual member frees him from domination by any party leader, in his body or in the White House. His principal work is performed on one or more committees, the chairmen of which ascend to the preeminent positions through seniority. Whether one likes it or not, a seniority chairman, answerable only to his own constituency, cannot be coerced by party leaders in his body nor in the presidential establishment. He is, to use an old east Texas phrase, "as independent as a hog on ice." Specialized jurisdictions make the committee system a system of power. The full powers of the parent body are parceled out among the committee chairmen, who must further parcel them out among subcommittee chairmen. A power-minded chairman may try to thwart his lieutenants in the exercise of their rightful power, but he is seldom successful. A feudal system is a tempting analogy and helpful within limits.
Paradoxically, the committee system also gives a member a chance to slip the bonds of localism. He can build subject-matter Congressional Government, 15th printing (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 69. competence as he gains seniority and so come to have a nation-wide constituency among those who are concerned by that subject matter, who court the member more assiduously than his home constituents do. One thinks of John Fogarty and Lister Hill in health; Wayne Morse, Carl Perkins and Edith Green in education; Mendel Rivers in armed services, and a host of others.
We begin then with a Congress which, more from political necessity than design, has achieved a large measure of independence from the other branches of the government and is the partner the Constitution intended it to be. That has its strengths and weaknesses, which can best be considered after an examination of the party leadership within Congress and the leadership of the President of the United States.
PARTY LEADERSHIP OF THE Two HOUSES
The principal leader of the House of Representatives is the Speaker. He has no counterpart in the Senate, where the most important leadership position is that of the Majority Leader.
The Speakership is historically rooted in the Speaker of the House of Commons in England, but our office has taken significant departures from its model. Like the English, our Speaker is the "House's man"; his principal glory is that he is wed to his House. A Speaker of the British House once told King Charles I, in answer to a royal question, "I have neither eyes to see, nor tongue to speak in this place, but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am here. . . ," and disked imprisonment and perhaps his head thereby.5
The British Speaker today is primarily a fair presiding officer. He is a member of Commons, elected by and "representing" a district, which usually returns him without challenge; but upon election he forswears partisanship, even ceasing to frequent places where he is likely to meet politicians. The rulings from the chair of the principal officer of the House of Commons must not be tainted by politics.
The American Speaker likewise is supposed to be, in the main, a fair presiding officer. But Speaker Cannon once remarked, "I am as fair as I can be, given the exigencies of American politics." So The same variability in role and performance can be found in the leadership in the Senate. If the present Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, were the norm, we could say the Leader is a kind of chairman, seeking to help the Democrats achieve what they want, personally and collectively. He seeks no power, even claiming that "I have less power than any other Senator." He has said that "Johnson was the greatest leader the Senate ever had," but he has no desire to be like Johnson. He does not attempt to round up votes. He believes that "Senators are grown men and can make up their own minds." Although he has held his leadership post longer than any other senator, he keeps in close touch with the needs and opinions of his Montana constituents and will put them ahead of almost any other business.6
Leaders, whatever their personalities, often are products of the Lyndon Johnson, too, had a special situation-a Republican president and a shattered party in the Senate.8 He carefully put the party back together and used it-and always some Republicans -to achieve a remarkable mastery of the Senate. He said "the only power available to a leader is the power of persuasion," but in his hands persuasion was a many-edged tool. He used his superiority in information, control of communications, rewards and punishments, to line up the votes. He usually had the compromises and the majority before he went to the floor. Mansfield has correctly stated that he and Johnson were "different personalities," with wholly different conceptions of the office.
So the party leadership positions have been many things at different times. The roles chosen by committee chairmen have varied as widely (though the job remains the same; the differences seem to be personal rather than situational) but they do not represent national party concerns, as the leaders do-or may. It is significant at this juncture of history that party leadership seems to concern itself almost wholly with what happens to bills after they come out of committee. On the substance of the laws. the feudal barons prevail. The case is easy to make that this was a presidential era.
Jackson, too, was strong. He rode into power on the crest of a genuine popular revolution, the builder of a grass-roots party. Jackson did not perceive his role as that of an initiator; but he used the veto unsparingly, and he did not hesitate to appeal to the people over the heads of Congress (on the United States bank issue). Moreover, he confidently proclaimed his capability of making his own constitutional interpretations.
But this presidential preeminence was not to last. The committee system made leadership difficult. More important, slavery was the dominant issue for the next two decades. It could not be solved but peace could be prolonged through compromise, a task for a numerous" institution, not a singular executive. Certainly, the presidents of this era were not distinguished. Lord Bryce, the English authority of The American Commonwealth, believed they were the most mediocre presidents in American history. "They were intellectual pygmies beside the real leaders of that generation -Clay, Calhoun, and Webster." And again, "Who now knows or cares to know about the character of James K. Polk or Franklin Pierce?"10 Who, indeed?
Lincoln's strength needs no testimonial but he did not exercise it through Congress. He relied on the "war powers," on his position as "Commander-in-Chief." He left Congress mostly to his secretaries. But this was indubitably a presidential era, with Lincoln exercising as near dictatorial powers as any executive in the country's history.
But his successor came as close to being ousted from his job by Congress as was possible. One senatorial vote saved him. There is no need to approve congressional policies of that time to recognize that Congress was in the saddle.
There followed then a period which Bryce thought had somewhat better presidents than in the pre-Civil War period. Perhaps so, but it was in 1888 that Bryce published his famous chapter, "Why Great Men are not Chosen Presidents."" One reason he gave was that "four-fifths of his work is the same in kind as that which devolves on the chairman of a commercial company or the manager of a railway. . . ," a judgment probably based on the incumbents of that period.'2 It is true that Congress deserves no plaudits either. It was a sad time, with the brains and aggression going into building and plundering the country, with government having to settle for second-best.
Theodore Roosevelt, the first modern president, recognized the great power of moral leadership; the White House, he said, was a "bully pulpit." He tried to capture the people's imagination with releases designed to hit the news-hungry Monday papers and his personal style was dynamic and dramatic. Nevertheless, his administration could not be called a presidential era. The tyrannical Cannon, his jaw set against the future and even his own time, gave Roosevelt little to gloat over. The rest is too recent to need recounting.
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: A BALANCE
The conventional wisdom of our time holds that Congress is the weak sister in the national triune and must be propped up and reformed. Congress is weak and the President strong, so it goes, and the imbalance is becoming progressively more grave. The argument is supported by a Janus-like logic which, in its way, is unanswerable: if a flood of major legislation is passed it is because Congress is weak and compliant; if legislation does not move it is because Congress is weak and obstructive. A national preoccupalion among the system pundits, therefore, is diagnosis of the con- It is safe to say the executive branch cannot match the warmth and versatility of Congress's representational performance. But who can strike a balance between that and the grand role of the President as chief of state, symbol of unity, spokesman for America? The founding fathers knew the Nation needed a king and gave it one. The endless difficulties caused by this unhappy mixture are well known, especially to a presidential candidate running against an incumbent. Nevertheless, the combination provides assets too. In a time of crisis no committee can equal the grandeur of the single leader.
The division of labor in the legislative function is not so easy to delineate. Congress is pleased to consider the President the initiator; his bills and messages are the points of departure, at least, for what the committees do. But congressmen initiate too, often well before a proposal has caught on with the public. When it does the Administration appropriates it as it pleases, seldom giving credit. The specialized committees probably give an individual measure as good consideration as it could get. They are in continuous communication with the interest groups which are themselves part of the representational system. But the executive agencies are, in effect, interest groups as well. Their help is invaluable in bringing to bear the vast resources of the bureaucracy. It is useful to think, not of a legislative policy system but of many, each made up of congressmen, bureaucrats, interest groups, and concerned publics, all of which are involved in a policy issue.
But one distinction may be made sharply: only the President so far can set priorities. Strengths have their costs: the decentralized power structure of Congress which is proof against presidential domination precludes the kind of party leadership which can make national programs. The congressional system has respected its inner logic, rejecting devices which might exercise control over the whole body, just as the English parliamentary system has rejected whatever might dilute the perfect and responsible concentration of power in the Prime Minister and his colleagues. We shall discuss later the attempt of Congress to set priorities through a reformed budget process.
What of control of the government? In his justly famous Considerations on Representative Government, published in 1861, John Stuart Mill said, "Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government. .*" 3 This the House of Commons tries to do by holding the ministry, which is its own leadership, responsible for all the acts of government. Congress requires in its rules that each specialized committee shall oversee the work of the agencies which administer the programs in the committee's jurisdiction. It is safe to say congressional oversight is not very effective. Congress can and does perform well as ombudsmen for constituents who think they find the bureaucracy unresponsive. But the important task is seeing that legislation is carried out as its authors intend in hearings and reports, floor debate and conference reports. There is no way that congressional committees can make sure that those who write regulations and supply details will read the record.
In fairness, it should be said that the President probably does not do much better. Two million civil servants spread across a continent-wide nation are hardly susceptible of control by a thin overlay of temporary political appointees. What makes the bureaucracy generally a productive and responsive partner in governance is not political control, it is likely, but professional integrity and a commitment to the democratic ideals which most of us share.
If A second disadvantage is that committees and subcommittees have such close ties with interest groups, which are an integral part of their world, that the subcommittee may come in effect to represent the interests. One thinks especially of the House Agriculture Committee, six of whose subcommittees were for many years organized along commodity lines, a frank admission that the job of the subcommittee is to protect the interests of those who produce that commodity. When the administrative agencies which carry out the programs are added, the circle is complete. There are differences among these parties to be sure, and they are not conspirators against the public interest, but there still is a parochialism and narrowness in their outlook.
What cannot be gainsaid is that the Congress cannot be held politically responsible for its overall performance. Congress is two houses, separate and distinct, with differing modes of operation. Congress is two parties, unable to hold party lines, not organized to take party positions. Congress is 40 standing committees, many more special committees, task forces, etc., each with a piece of the job. Congress is 535 individual members, each catering to his own district or state and depending on his own resources to retain his seat. Nowhere is there a handle with which to take hold of the whole Congress. The President must face the whole people but he truly leads Congress only occasionally and for short periods. He can go down in utter ruin without necessarily affecting the. fortunes of a single member of Congress.
Weaknesses and strengths often are opposite sides of the same coin. The glory of Congress is that it is an independent national legislature, truly the last of that kind. It can oppose the President, override his veto, and hold him to account. There should be great national pride in that.
To the citizens it offers multiple points of access. No individual nor group need penetrate to a ministry; one's own congressman or a committee member will be available and frequently can be effective help. Frequent trips home by most members assure that the opinions of the great Nation are pretty accurately reflected on Capitol Hill. Not so with the President. Given the vastness of his domain and the necessary shield between him and people, he is apt to fall The same is true with the questions of why Congress is slow, and why Congress does not pass legislation that solves our problems. There is no proof that hurrying legislation makes it better nor that anyone knows what legislation will solve problems. In its 200 years of life the Nation has endured travail and made much progress. Today we face bright opportunities and threatening crises. Like the people who create it biennially and sustain it, Congress must do the best it can.
